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The Indian Ocean’s New Colonial Logic: Ports, Power and Strategic Dependence

By Ayesha Saddiqua, Universitas Islam International Indonesia

16 November 2026·6 min read

Indian Ocean
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At the 8th Indian Ocean International Conference in Muscat in February 2025, the dominant discussions were on maritime security, economic cooperation, and regional stability. The message was clear: the Indian Ocean should remain a space of openness, opportunity, and shared prosperity. Yet beyond the diplomatic language, a different reality is taking shape. China claims its growing naval footprint is to protect trade and ensure stability. The U.S. states that its bases maintain freedom of navigation. For the Gulf states, investments such as the UAE-based DP World's current stake in the port of Berbera in Somaliland are defined as economic partnerships. States claim they are securing the Indian Ocean for collective prosperity. So why does the region gradually feel occupied?

This is the puzzle we refuse to confront. If one looks beyond the polished diplomatic jargon, the Indian Ocean is slowly beginning to resemble a familiar historical pattern: powerful states gaining strategic footholds over weaker coastal nations through ports, bases, debts, and military pacts. No one calls it colonialism anymore. Yet the structure seems disturbingly similar. The Indian Ocean is being colonized again—this time not by flags and formal empires but by infrastructure, maritime security, and strategic dependence.

History has made this irony hard to ignore. The Indian Ocean was the center of colonial expansion in the past. The Portuguese were the first to arrive, followed by the Dutch, the French, and the British. Initially, none were known for conquering entire civilizations. They controlled ports, trade routes, and maritime checkpoints. Colonialism spread from the coastline inward. Whoever controlled the sea controlled the economy; whoever controlled the economy eventually controlled politics.

That same logic is quietly recurring. Consider the geopolitics of the contemporary powers in the Indian Ocean. China has a military base in Djibouti near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world's busiest shipping lanes. The U.S. government keeps a strong naval and air force presence on Diego Garcia, a base established after the displacement of the Chagossian people from their homeland. India is aggressively building strategic partnerships and infrastructure in the Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles to ward off China's influence. Gulf monarchies, meanwhile, are acquiring shares in ports from East Africa to South Asia, extending their commercial reach into geopolitical leverage.

Each of these developments is explained separately as practical and defensive. Together, they offer a glimpse of something greater: the Indian Ocean is emerging as a chessboard of competing external powers. And, like colonialism before it, this competition revolves around access. Not all modern empires annex territory. They lease ports for decades, finance infrastructure with debt, negotiate military logistics agreements, and create strategic dependence slowly enough that it appears voluntary. Influence no longer arrives in the form of governors-general. It comes in the form of investment packages and security cooperation frameworks. This is precisely what makes this new form of colonization difficult to recognize.

In the 20th century, anti-colonial struggles were waged against the presence of a colonial power. Today, the notion of sovereignty is diffused. According to Darshana M. Baruah (2024), a small island state becomes more dependent on a larger regional power for security in return for granting it military bases. Strategic decisions increasingly reflect the interests of external actors, as survival itself becomes linked to them. Formally independent nations begin to operate within invisible zones of influence. Those who champion this system argue that comparisons to colonialism are exaggerated. After all, today's agreements are legal! They are accepted by governments. Roads, ports, jobs, and investment come with infrastructure projects. Military collaboration can deter threats and safeguard shipping lanes. But colonialism itself was often justified within the discourse of order and development. "Might" and "power" were the terms used by the British Empire to define its control of the sea as essential for the stability of world trade. Colonial infrastructure was defined as modernization by the European powers. Exploitation was never the Empire's name for it; it was "partnership."

The rhetoric has not changed as much as we imagine. Take Diego Garcia. The island remains one of the most strategically significant U.S. military bases in the world. Yet its existence depends heavily on the historical eviction of the Chagossian population, many of whom continue to campaign for repatriation. Or think about China's Belt and Road Initiative, which runs through the Indian Ocean via ports and infrastructure and deepens Beijing's strategic reach. Even India—itself a victim of colonial maritime domination—increasingly speaks the language of strategic primacy in the ocean.

All the great powers claim to be acting defensively. China fears encirclement by the U.S. and India. India is worried about China's expansion in the waters around its neighboring countries. The United States is afraid that it will lose control of the Indo-Pacific. Gulf countries are worried about the insecurity of supply chains and geopolitical risk. This is how spheres of influence emerge: every expansion is justified as a response to another expansion. What emerges is an Indian Ocean crowded not only with ships but with competing strategic claims over geography. And the people most affected by this transformation are rarely those shaping it.

Fishermen in the Chagos Archipelago and around the ports of Djibouti have lost access to coastal waters as naval zones grow. Huge infrastructure projects displace local populations and cause environmental degradation. Smaller states such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Mauritius are forced to choose sides. Their sovereignty still exists on paper, but in reality it is being squeezed. That is what neo-colonialism is about: control without rule. The tragedy is that the post-colonial world should have moved beyond this logic. Nations across Asia and Africa fought fierce battles for independence, to break free from outside influence over their economies and policy decisions. However, the Indian Ocean is now set to become a sea of strategic autonomy again, as bigger powers vie for influence in the region. The techniques are more advanced than ever before, but sophistication does not ease hierarchy.

So it is that the debate on the Indian Ocean is still somewhat silent. We are comfortable criticizing colonialism when it is securely in the past. We are less comfortable identifying its contemporary manifestations, which come wrapped in legality, investment, and diplomacy. The twenty-first century wants influence without accountability—power exercised through a contract, not a conquest. Ports, however, can be weapons of domination just as forts once were.

The Indian Ocean is not just about trade. It is the hub of a new geopolitical struggle for control of the arteries of globalization itself. These waters now connect energy supplies, shipping routes, digital cables, military shipping and logistics, and strategic chokepoints. A dominant player in them has a tremendous advantage in the global economy of the future. That is why every major power wants a foothold there, and that is why the world shouldn't pretend that this is simply a development or maritime security issue. Something larger is unfolding: an imperial competition for the twenty-first century. The ocean is being divided again. Only this time, no one needs to raise a colonial flag.

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